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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
MAMIE J. TEMPEST,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.. JAMES K. RICHARDSON and
'WILMA L. RICHARDSON,
his wife,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No .
8466

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondents, hereinafter called the defendants,
concede that appellant's Statement of Facts is correct in
all material and substantial respects. Appellant will hereinafter be referred to as plaintiff. However, it is respectfully pointed out that references to the claimed acts of
negligence alleged in plaintiff's complaint, which are
mentioned in the Statement of Facts, are not established
by any evidence.
The plaintiff's complaint, in substance, alleges that
plaintiff asked to be directed to the lavatory on defendants' premises and that she was carelessly and negligently
directed by Mrs. Richardson toward a certain door; that
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the door to which plaintiff's attention was directed was
constructed and maintained in a negligent manner so as
to create a hidden trap unknown to plaintiff.
The record actually shows that no directions were
asked or given and that plaintiff's attention was not directed to any door and in particular to the door which
she opened. The record further shows that plaintiff and
Mrs. Richardson were in the kitchen of defendants' home
following a dinner in another part of the house. The
two women were alone when plaintiff left the kitchen
area by entering an adjacent hallway and at the same
time stating, ul am going to the lavatory." Mrs. Richardson, one of the defendants, simply replied, nThe light
is on." ( TR. 13 -14)
Plaintiff's decision to open the cellar door, which was
closed, and to step forward into a dark and unlighted
void was not influenced or directed by any act or word
of either defendant. The record is clear that Mr. Richardson was not present at the time and was completely
unaware of what was happening. The record is likewise
perfectly clear that Mrs. Richardson did not follow
plaintiff into the hallway and therefore could not have
been aware of plaintiff's movements or that she was about
to open the door leading to the cellar steps. (D. 13-17 It
is certain that plaintiff asked for no directions even after
she had mistakenly entered a lighted bedroom or den
thinking it was the lavatory. The statement made by
Mrs. Richardson was clear and explicit that the lavatory light was on so that plaintiff was advised, if not
warned, that she should look /or a lighted room and not
one in complete and total darkness.
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I. THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO A
MATERIAL FACT.

(a) THE PLAINTIFF WAS A SOCIAL GUEST
ENTITLED ONLY TO THE PROTECTION OWED
TO A GRATUITOUS LICENSEE AND AS TO
PLAINTIFF THE DEFENDANTS COMMITTED NO
AFFIRMATIVE ACT OF NEGLIGENCE AND VIOLATED NO DUTY OWING TO THE PLAINTIFF.
(b) THE PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

ARGUMENT
I. THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO A
MATERIAL FACT.
(a) PLAINTIFF WAS A SOCIAL GUEST ENTITLED ONLY TO THE PROTECTION OWED TO
A GRATUITOUS LICENSEE, AND AS TO PLAINTIFF THE DEFENDANTS COMMITTED NO AFFIRMATIVE ACT OF NEGLIGENCE AND VIOLATED NO DUTY OWING TO THE PLAINTIFF.

Plaintiff concedes in her brief that, as to the defendants' she occupied the status of a social guest. As such,
plaintiff was a gratuitous, or, as is sometimes called, a
bare licensee.
McHenry v. Howells, (Ore.) 272 P. 2d 21 0
Taneian v. Meghrigian, N.J.) 99 Atl. 2d 207
Keretian v. Asadourian, (Ill.) 110 N.E. 2d 679
Lubenow v. Cook, (Conn.) 79 Atl. 2d 826
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McNamara v. Hall, (Wash.) 233 P. 2d 852
O'Brien v. Shea, (Mass.) 96 N.E. 2d 163
Biggs v. Bear, (Ill.) 51 N.E. 2d 799
Laube v. Stevenson, (Conn.) 78 Atl. 2d 693

It is most important to bear the status of the plaintiff
constantly in mind because the authorities, so far as we
have been able to determine, are unanimous in holding
that the only duty which a host owes to a social guest
is to refrain from affirmative acts likely to cause injury
and to warn the guest of hidden or concealed dangers
which the guest by the exercise of ordinary care cannot
or may not see and avoid.
Taneian v. Meghrigian, supra
N iebes v. Order of Eagles, (Ohio) 114 N .E. 2d 2 60
Keretian v. Asadourian, supra
Scheibel v. Lipton, (Ohio) 102 N.E. 2d 453
Bogateroff v. Coplan, New York Supp., 108
N.Y.S. 2d 205
Lubenow v. Cook, supra
O'Brien v. Shea, supra
McHenry v. Howells, supra
Furthermore, a host is not liable to a guest for ordinary acts of negligence.
Niebes v. Order of Eagles, supra
Biggs v. Bear, supra
The rule is likewise well established that a social
guest takes the premises of his host as he finds them and
the host is only obligated to provide the guest with the
same protection which he takes for himself and members
of his own family, and no more.
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Taneian v. Meghrigian, supra
Vogel v. Eckert, (N.J.) 91 Atl. 2d 633
McHenry v. Howells, supra
Biggs v. Bear, supra

:I(

The law is also well established that a host is not the
insurer of the safety of a social guest and is under no
duty to reconstruct his premises for the safety of a guest.
Scheibel v. Lipton, supra
McHenry v. Howells, supra

J;

In two very respectable jurisdictions in this country
it has been held that there must be evidence of willful
and wanton injury before a host can be held liable to a
social guest for injuries sustained on the premises of the
host.
Keretian v. Asadourian, supra
Gregory v. Loder, (N.J.) 185 Atl. 360
If the foregoing are the rules by which the conduct
of the defendants is to be measured, and we submit that
they are, then every issue of fact which must be decided
is disclosed by the record now before this court and does
not require the taking of any evidence to amplify that
which is already made plain.
Plaintiff cites many cases in her brief in support of
the proposition that summary judgment is improper if,
upon the record, any material issue remains to be decided which if decided for the plaintiff would sustain
a judgment in her favor. The defendants have no quarrel
with the rule contended for but deny that the rule and
the cases cited in support of it have any application to
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this case. We will point out hereafter why no material
issue of fact exists which could or might change the
result of the trial court's ruling.
We cannot pass the contentions of the plaintiff without referring to the reasons which make summary judgment a desirable procedural remedy in applicable cases.
The rule is designed to save the time and expense of
parties, their counsel, witnesses, jurors and the courts
when the record in a case discloses that it may be decided equitably and fairly to all concerned without the
necessity for a trial. That this saving of time and expense is desirable needs no supporting argument. This
court has recognized the desirability of the rule_ by
adopting it as part of the rules of civil procedure applicable to all civil cases in this jurisdiction. Mr. Justice
Crockett in his concurring opinion in the very recently
decided case of Holland v. Colzunbia Iron Mining Co.,
(Utah) 293 P. 2d 700, says this:
nit is true, indeed, that a summary judgment
is a drastic remedy which the courts are, and
should be reluctant to use. Yet it does have a
salutary purpose in the administration of justice
in not requiring the time, trouble and expense of
trial, when the best showing the plaintiff can possibly claim would not entitle him to a judgment.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff does not mean that the court
should pick out all of the aspects thereof favorable
to supporting plaintiff's claim and ignore those
that indicate to the contrary. It means that the
court surveys the whole picture, takes into consideration facts and inferences therefrom tending
to favor the plaintiff's position, and also considers
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other facts appearing which must be accepted
as a matter of law, and weighs the whole matter
against the background of legal precepts bearing
on the problem. If when so viewed, reasonable
minds could make findings that would make out
a cause of action in accordance with the plaintiff's claims, summary judgment should not be
granted; on the other hand, if it appears to the
court that reasonable minds could not make findings which would establish a cause of action for
the plaintiff, then the summary judgment is
proper."
Based upon the proposition that when the whole picture presented by the record in this case is considered,
reasonable minds could not make findings which would
sustain a judgment for the plaintiff, the order of the trial
court granting summary judgment should be affirmed.
There is no contention that the defendants did any
affirmative act which caused plaintiff's injury. Since the
authorities, which we have cited above, hold that a guest
must accept the premises of his host as he finds them and
the host is under no duty to rebuild or reconstruct his
premises to make them safer for his guest than they are
for himself and the members of his own family, no recovery may be predicated in this case upon the claim that the
premises were negligently constructed or maintained.
The brief of the plaintiff discloses two propositions
which are relied upon to support the claim that the summary judgment entered by the trial court was erroneous.
They are: (a) That no warning was given by Mrs. Richardson that the particular door which plaintiff opened
gave access to the cellar, and (b) that the manner in
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which the stairway was constructed was defective and,
therefore, as to the plaintiff, was negligent maintenance.
We have cited the cases above which fully sustain the
defendants' position that it does not lie in the mouth of
the plaintiff to criticize the construction of the house to
which she had been invited for purely social purposes,
therefore, we will make no further reference to that particular point in the plaintiff's brief.
The gist of plaintiff's argument regarding a lack of
any warning is substantially as follows:
The plaintiff was unfamiliar with defendants' home
and the location of the cellar stairs; that she entered the
general area where the stairway was located, which fact
was known to Mrs. Richardson, and the latter, being
familiar with the claimed negligent way in which the
stairway had been constructed with the door opening inwardly over a stairway with no top landing, was charged
with the duty of warning the plaintiff to avoid opening
this door.
This argument ignores entirely the fact that the lavatory to which plaintiff intended going was not anywhere
near the cellar door. (See defendants' Exhibit 1 attached
to plaintiff's deposition.) Plaintiff walked past the area
where the lavatory was located and into an area where
Mrs. Richardson could not reasonably be expected to
assume the plaintiff would go. On the other hand Mrs.
Richardson was entirely justified in assuming that the
plaintiff would confine her wanderings to her announced
destination. Furthermore, it is to be borne in mind that
plaintiff was directed specifically to a lighted room, not to
one which was in complete darkness. If any assumptions
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are to be allowed in this case we submit that Mrs. Richardson had a right to assume that when she warned plaintiff that the light to the lavatory was on, plaintiff would
not do as she did and open the cellar door and step into
an unlighted area when she was totally unable to see into
what dangers her path was leading her. An attempt is
made to excuse the conduct of the plaintiff by contending
that she followed the given directions and went to a
lighted room ·which she discovered, upon entering, was
not a lavatory but a den or a bedro01n. Hence, it is argued,
having gone into a room which was lighted she was then
free to enter any room or area in the premises, lighted or
unlighted, as she saw fit and if, in consequence, she fell
down a stairway she could not see, the host must be held
liable for her injuries. To us, the logic of this reasoning,
to say the least, is obscure. Was plaintiff entitled to assume that because the bedroom was lighted, the lavatory
was unlighted? Or was she justified in remaining silent
and not advising Mrs. Richardson that she was lost or
confused and in not asking her for further directions?
We submit that she had been adequately advised as to
what she would find when she got to the lavatory, namely,
that it was lighted, and she should, as a reasonable person,
have looked further for another lighted room or else she
should have asked her hostess for further directions. We
will discuss further under another section of this brief
the conduct of the plaintiff in opening the cellar door
and stepping forward into complete darkness.
The complete answer to plaintiff's argument that the
defendants' house constituted a trap and that defendants
were under a duty to warn plaintiff to avoid such trap
will be found in the announced decisions to which refer-
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ence is now made. Uniformly and, so far as we have been
able to determine, unanimously, the courts, in considering
situations such as the one disclosed by this record, have
held that there can be no recovery for one in the position
of the plaintiff. They also hold that a stairway such as
the one here involved is not a trap and that failure of a
host to warn a guest in the circumstances here presented
is not negligence. For instance, in the case cited in appellant's brief, McHenry v. Howells, supra, the following
factual situation is disclosed. Plaintiff, a social guest, fell
in attempting to descend a stairway. She contended that
the stairway was defectively constructed and constituted
a trap of which defendants should have given warning.
The case quotes fully the rules applicable to social guests,
and regarding the matter of hidden defects and traps says:
((The evidence is directed solely to an alleged
structural defect in the stairway and to the failure
of defendants to warn plaintiff thereof. It is manifest that the alleged defect did not constitute a
trap or hidden peril within the meaning of the
law. The condition of the stairway was open and
obvious; it could readily be observed by a person
exercising ordinary care for his own safety. Defendants were under no obligation to reconstruct
the stairway for the protection of the plaintiff.
Plaintiff took the premises as she found them."
A non-suit granted on the defendants' motion was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Oregon. In the case of
Biggs v. Bear, supra, the Supreme Court of Illinois said
the following:
uunder the ISSUeS plaintiff WaS required tO
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prove that defendants violated a duty to warn
her, their guest, of a dangerous arrangement of
doors in their kitchen; and that while exercising
due care and as a result of defendants' failure to
warn her, and their further negligence in failing
to light and guard, and provide a landing between the door and the steps of the rear stairway, she fell down the stairs and was injured."
In Biggs v. Bear, supra, as in the case under consideration,
the .plaintiff, a social guest, fell down some stairs when
she opened a door after inquiring as to the location of
a washroom. She opened a door away from her and
stepped and looked simultaneously into a dark area.
There was no light and there was no landing. There were
three or four doors which looked alike. Plaintiff, being
unfamiliar with the premises, did not know the plan or
location of the stairs and no warning was given her. The
Supreme Court of Illinois on these facts held that the
plaintiff was a social guest, that she took the premises as
she found them. The court further stated that a social
guest becomes a member of the family of the host and
cannot stand upon the duty owed to a business invitee
and further held that a social guest cannot recover against
a host for ordinary negligence. In deciding the case the
court further stated:
ulf a licensee (the plaintiff), the court properly directed the verdict, since there was no evidence of willful and wanton misconduct."
In deciding this case the Supreme Court of Illinois found
that the situation presented by the facts did not constitute a trap. The situation revealed in that case is so
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strikingly similar to the case under consideration as to be
most startling. We submit that the case is controlling
upon the right of the plaintiff to recover in this action.
The case of Keretian v. Asadourian, supra, involves
facts of a similar nature where a guest fell down a stairway after being informed by her host that the bathroom
was located in a hallway and who, in looking for the
bathroom at the end of said hallway, opened a doorway
leading downstairs and fell and was injured. It was likewise stated in that case that because there was evidence
insufficient to establish that the host's failure to give the
guest further directions and assistance was willful and
wanton and in the absence of evidence of a conscious indifference to the consequences on the part of the host
in failing to assist the guest, there could be no recovery.

Taneian v. Meghrigian, supra, was also a stairway case
involving slightly different circumstances but in which a
claim was made that the stairway used by the social guest
had been defectively constructed. The court held that
there could be no recovery and stated:
uone who comes on premises by express invitation to enjoy hospitality as a guest of the
owner ,_c. ,_c. * has only the right of a licensee and
must take the property as he finds it."
And stated further:
uwhere one VISitS the private home of another as a social guest the owner is bound to take
the same care of him that he takes of himself,
and the other members of his family, and no
more."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Another very interesting case on the question of
whether a stairway constitutes a trap and one which involved, not as here a social guest, but a business invitee is
Hertz v. Advertiser Company (Ala.) 78 S. 794. It
must be borne in mind in considering this case that the
rule as to business invitees and the duty imposed upon
the owner of premises is much broader and much stricter
than is the case where a purely social guest is involved.
It the Hertz case, supra, the plaintiff opened a door
from a vestibule which led immediately to a stairway
which was not protected by any landing. The stairway
was unlighted and in proceeding the plaintiff fell and was
injured. The door opened inwardly over the stairway.
It will be observed that the door opened in exactly the
same manner as is alleged in plaintiff's complaint in this
case. It was held by the Alabama court that the plaintiff
could not recover. The court specifically held that the
stairway, as constructed, was not a trap and further held
that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence for
proceeding without first ascertaining that it was safe for
her to do so. On the question of whether the stairway
constituted a trap, the court said:
((This rule ,z. ::- ::- does not apply to places
strictly private, nor to places to which the public
are not entitled or expected ::- ::- ::- to go."
And stated further:
((We agree ':- ::- ::- that the evidence fails to
show that the defendant was guilty of * ::- ::negligence in constructing a ctrap' or (pitfall' on
its premises, within the meaning of the * * ::- rule
of law."
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We will have further reference to make to this case when
we discuss in another section of our brief the subject of
contributory negligence.
The Alabama court cites from Brugher v. Buchtenkirch, (N.Y.) 60 N.E. 420, that a person must expect
to find stairs in the hallways of buildings which case
stated:
tt* ::· * we know of no reason or custom which
justifies one entering a strange house in assuming
that the hall will continue at the same level."

The Alabama court quoted with approval a Massachusetts
case, the name of which is not indicated as follows:
HWe cannot think such a construction is of
itself defective or negligent."
An interesting case on the subject of what constitutes
a trap is Alabama Great Southern v. Campbell, (Ala.) 26
So. 2d 124. This case involved a railroad crossing into
private land which was reached over a narrow road which
crossed the defendant's tracks. The plaintiff's son driving
the plaintiff's automobile over the crossing caught the
wheels on the rails which prevented the driver from getting
the car off the track. It was struck by a passing train
and was damaged. It was claimed that the crossing was
a trap. It was held there could be no recovery. After
holding that the driver was a trespasser or a bare licensee,
the court said:
uA trap has been defined as ca danger which a
person who does not know the premises could
not avoid by reasonable care or skill.' cTraps
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must be intentionally set for the licensee.'
~certainly the crossing involved in this case
could in nowise be regarded as a trap.'"
Furthermore, the plaintiff in opening the door to the
cellar and stepping inside entered into a portion of defendants' premises to which she had asked no permission
to enter and to which no invitation had been extended.
The law is clear that when a social guest enters a portion of the host's premises to which no invitation has been
extended, the guest cannot recover for injuries received
on the portion of the premises thus entered. In such a
situation there is not even a duty to warn even though a
trap may exist in fact. Laube v. Stevenson, supra, Lube-

now v. Cook, supra, Hertz v. Advertiser Company, supra.
It is plain from the record that the plaintiff was not
asked or invited to visit the defendants' cellar. In opening the cellar door and entering she exceeded the lil'!lits
of her right to use the defendants' premises and any untoward event occurring to her was a risk which she assumed herself. It is no answer for plaintiff to contend
that she was unaware of the dangers into which her journey
was leading her or that she should have been warned. As
we have already pointed out, neither of the defendants
knew what plaintiff was about to do.
Failure to warn even under such circumstances would
not excuse the want of ordinary care on the part of the
plaintiff. James K. Richardson was completely unaware
of what was taking place and all that Mrs. Richardson
knew was that plaintiff said she was going to the lavatory.
A duty to warn only exists when the host knows that
the guest is exposed to dangers which he knows are con-
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cealed from the guest or which the guest is unlikely t-o
discover for himself and against which he should not he
expected to protect himself.
Reference has already been made to the cases holding
that stairways are not traps even when constructed as
the one here involved was constructed. These cases likewise hold that stairways are not traps even though unlighted and even though they are constructed without
landings. Social and even business guests are supposed to
know that there is at least a possibility that when one
opens a door on unfamiliar premises he may immediately
encounter a stairway and that if he opens such a door
and encounters darkness he should either be extremely
cautious or not venture forward at all or until he can
see where he is going.
Plaintiff in her brief relies upon the case of Deacy v.
McDonnell, (Conn.) 38 Atl. 2d 181. That case involved
a social guest of the servant of the defendants, who, in
leaving the premises at night, fell because she did not see
a step down to the porch and the servant failed to turn
on the light so that she could see. Aside from the fact
that the case announces a very questionable rule of law,
it is very different from the facts here presented. The
case is bad law because it held defendants liable to a
social guest, not invited upon the premises by them, but
by their servant in connection with the servant's social
pursuits. It made the servant's act in failing to turn on
the light the act of the defendants. The case is decided
upon the theory that failure to turn on the light was
negligence. It simply held that in the absence of so
doing a warning should have been given to the plaintiff.
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In the Deacy case the plaintiff was leaving the premises
by a route she had to traverse or at least one which she
might be expected to use. In this case the plaintiff was
not expected nor did she have any reason to use the
cellar steps in going to the lavatory. Furthermore, the
Deacy case stands alone as one which imposed liability
upon a host for injuries to a social guest in a situation
not comparable to this case and is not in accord with
the overwhelming weight of authority.
(b) THE PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
It should require no citation of authorities to sustain
the proposition that a licensee, social or otherwise, is
under a duty to exercise reasonable care for his own
safety. This court has more than once announced such
a rule in cases involving business invitees toward whom
a much higher duty of care exists than toward a social
guest.
Knox v. Snow, (Utah) 229 P. 2d 874
Scoffield v. Sprouse Reitz, (Utah) 265 P. 2d 396.
In Knox v. Snow, supra, this court said:
((Plaintiff seeks to justify his failure to observe
the danger which was clearly visible because his
sole interest was in the tire on the rack; that he
didn't see the ladder or the pit because he wasn't
looking at the floor or wasn't watching where he
was stepping :-.- * ::- It thus becomes apparent that
this is not a case where plaintiff used reasonable
care for his own safety. A reasonable person
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makes some observations along the path he chooses
to follow."
This court held the plaintiff in that case was guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of law for his failure
to take reasonable care for his own safety.
In other jurisdictions involving both business invitees
and social guests, the same rule has been announced in
many cases.
Lubenow v. Cook, supra
McHenry v. Howells, supra
Hertz v. Advertiser Company, supra
Brugher v. Buchtenkirch, supra
McNaughton v. The Railway Company, (Iowa)
113 N.W. 845
That such rules of conduct are reasonable can scarcely
be denied. It is submitted that the plaintiff in this case
did not conform to the rule which required her to take
that care of herself which she should be reasonably expected to exercise and which, if so exercised, would have
prevented any injury at all from occurring.
On page 10 of her brief plaintiff asks the question
if one may he held negligent who opens a door and steps
forward even though the space on the other side of it
is dark and if one may not assume that where a door
opens inwardly there will be a floor or platform beyond
or if one is obliged to assume that open space will be encountered or a stairway. The answer to the first question is that when anyone steps blindly into a situation
where he cannot see, he is negligent. In Hertz v. The
Advertiser Company, supra, the court said as follows:
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ttWe are of the opinion that the undisputed
evidence showed plaintiff to have been guilty of
negligence ~- ~- * if they (the premises) were not
properly lighted, she should have been more careful in going out of the vestibule into the main
office building. She had no right to assume that
the floor of the office building was on the same
level as the floor of the vestibule. There was a
door between the two apartments, and this of
itself was a warning to those entering, who were
not acquainted, to ascertain whether the floor to
the main building was on a level with the vestibule and sidewalk or whether it was reached by
ascending or descending stairs. She is shown not
to have exercised the slightest degree of care to
ascertain what was beyond the door which separated the vestibule from the floor of the main
office. Her own evidence shows that this door
was shut, that she herself opened it, and stepped
or walked right through as if the floor were on
a level, and fell down the stairs in consequence
of her own negligence, in failing to ascertain
whether or not there were steps or stairs * ~- ~- ."
We have already cited the quotation from Brugher v.
Buchtenkirch, supra, to the same effect that one may not
assume on entering a strange house that a hall will continue on the same level. To the same effect is a quotation
from Hoyt v. Woodbury, (Mass.) 86 N.E. 772 in which
the court said:
((Persons entering such buildings are charged
with knowledge that they are not entering from
a perfectly level sidewalk ~- ~- * etc."
And in McNa.ughton v. The Railway Company, supra,
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the court had this to say as quoted 1n the Hertz case,
supra:
((The fact that a door is there is a warning
that it is the means of exit or of entrance from
or to some other apartment and a way up or
down stairs, or to a baggage-room, or to a closet;
and no one has the right to assume, without knowledge, or its equivalent, the character of the place
to which it affords access."
In Scoffield v. Sprouse Reitz, supra, this court held
that a business invitee could not assume that there was
a railing surrounding a platform when the plaintiff fell
from the platform as he turned to leave the premiSes
without looking to see if there was a railing.
The plaintiff in this case did exactly the same thing
as was done by the plaintiff in Biggs v. Bear, supra. There
the plaintiff, not knowing which of three doors gave
access to a washroom, opened the stairway door, stepped
forward into darkness and fell down the stairway. We
submit that the conduct of the plaintiff in this case was
identical to that of the plaintiff in Biggs v. Bear, supra,
and that, as a consequence, the plaintiff in this case has
no better or superior right to expect recovery than the
plaintiff in the case cited.
An analogous situation involving drivers of automobiles has been decided in several cases by this court, in
which it has been held negligence for a driver to operate
a car forward on a highway when he cannot see what
is ahead of him. See Nikoleropoulos v. Rantsey, 61 Utah
465,214 P. 304; Dalley v. Mid-Western Dairy Products
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Co., 80 Utah 331, 15 P. 2d 309 and Hansen v. Clyde, 89
Utah 31, 56 P. 2d 1366~

If the foregoing cases constitute good law and if it
is neglige~ce for a driver to operate an automobile so
that he cannot stop it within the distance he can see
ahead of him, how may one step forward into blackness
and escape the charge that he was negligent in so doing?
As the cases above cited hold, one who is upon
premises with which he is unfamiliar may not assume
any condition of safety beyond his range of vision, especially if concealed by darkness. One must assume that
a stairway may lie behind a closed door and act accordingly. One may not assume that a platform will
exist beyond such a door merely because it might be a
good idea to have one. These rules apply with special
force and emphasis to a social guest. Certain it is that
the plaintiff had no right to assume that the door which
she opened and stepped inside of, led to the lavatory.
Furthermore, one should not be heard to complain if
he proceeds into an area where he cannot see what lies
before him, especially if he has been told specifically to
look for an area which has been lighted for his protection.
It is respectfully submitted that the record here
plainly shows that plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law and to require the trial
court to hear further evidence as to whether the lavatory
light was actually on or off could serve no useful purpose. Counsel cites the correct rule of law applicable to
this case from 38 Am. fur., Sec. 184, page 861, as follows:
((He will be deemed to have been guilty (of
negligence) if it is shown that he knew or reas-
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onably should have known of the peril and might
have avoided it by the exercise of ordinary care."
CONCLUSION
Because the record in this case already conclusively
shows that plaintiff was a social guest or a gratuitous
licensee on the premises of defendants at the time of her
injury, and it further appears that defendants were
guilty of no active affirmative negligence toward her,
and no situation existed which constituted a trap of
which defendants had a duty to warn the plaintiff, and
she herself by her own want of ordinary care brought
about her injuries, the summary judgment entered by
the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER and
ALBERT R. BOWEN

Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents
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